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Infrastructure and FDI: Assessing the Transmission Channel with a
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Part III: FDI in India
• Chapter 7: Meyer, B. 2016. Product Mix and Foreign Ownership:
Evidence from India’s Investment Liberalization
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CHAPTER 0. PREFACE
These papers empirically investigate various topics in the field of interna-
tional and development economics. Five of these papers are co-authored
with other researchers. These co-authors are
Julian Donaubauer researcher at the Helmut Schmidt University, Ham-
burg, Germany
Philipp Hühne researcher at the Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg,
Germany
Peter Nunnenkamp senior researcher at the Kiel Institute for the World
Economy, Kiel, Germany
The work was split equally across co-authors for those papers written in co-
operation. My contribution in all these papers was substantial. I contributed
most to the empirical work.
For copyright reasons the previously published chapters cannot be included
in the electronic version of this dissertation. Please see the respective journal
articles which can be accessed via the links given on the respective pages.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Sustainable development, growth promotion and sharing prosperity are the
main aims of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. To support
this aim and to assist the economic development of new partnerships, higher
levels of foreign aid are demanded by the United Nation. Promoting devel-
opment is one of the main goals of foreign aid programs, even the motivation
behind aid giving might not be fully altruistic, and potentially depends on
historical ties, political and strategical goals, and economical considerations
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Berthélemy, 2006).
Aid for Trade (AfT), with the purpose of facilitating exports, imports and
foreign direct investments (FDI), has become a major part of the foreign aid
distribution. AfT aims to improve the performance of developing countries
in harnessing the benefits from international trade. The integration into
international markets and the inflow of FDI is associated with welfare gains
and economic growth for developing countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005;
2005; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Borensztein et al, 1998). Foreign aid,
in particular in trade related needs, has the potential to alleviate the lack
of net capital flows to less developed countries, to reduce severe supply-side
constraints, to improving market environments and to facilitate participation
of developing countries in international trade.
The economical considerations behind granting aid are also encouraged by
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For
example, the OECD claims that “Official Development assistance-backed ef-
forts to enhance the investment climate are relevant in the context of attract-
ing FDI” (OECD, 2006, p.18). An extensive literature shows the positive
impact of FDI on firm performance. Empirical as well as theoretical liter-
ature shows the positive impact of FDI on productivity, trade, innovation
and wages (see for example Harris and Robinson, 2003; Görg and Greenaway,
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2004: Markusen, 2004). Various policies have been designed in developing
countries to attract FDI. In India, for example, tax holidays and additional
depreciation of 20 percent on new investments are promised to foreign in-
vestors (United Nations, 2000; Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
2015).
Only a few authors so far have exploit the link between AfT, trade and FDI.
A recent wave of literature focuses on the effectiveness of development as-
sistance on trade (see among others Martínez-Zarzosa et al, 2009; Calí and
te Velde, 2011; Nelson and Juhasz Silva, 2012; Johansson and Pettersson,
2012; Helble et al, 2012). My dissertation wants to fill this gap. I empirically
show that AfT increases trade with donor countries but as well with other
developing countries. Further, aid targeted at infrastructure needs helps to
remove obstacles of foreign investors related to transportation, communi-
cation, financial and energy-related infrastructure. A higher inflow of FDI
is associated with higher technology and knowledge spillovers and higher
product-level dynamic which are important drivers of productivity growth
and economic development.
The first part of my dissertation analyzes the link between AfT and trade.
To investigate who really benefits from the AfT initiative, together with
Philipp Hühne and Peter Nunnenkamp, I take a closer look on the donor and
recipient countries trade pattern. In chapter 2, we simultaneously estimate
and compare the effects of AfT on trade with donors. We find that AfT
increases recipient exports to donors as well as recipient imports from donors.
The first effect tends to dominate the latter, which contradicts the skeptical
view that donors grant AfT primarily to promote their own export interests.
Chapter 3 extends this work to South-South trade. AfT granted by OECD
donors seems to strengthen the trade relations of recipient countries with
other developing countries. Chapter 4 further differentiates the impact of
AfT on trade in differentiated manufacturing goods and trade in primary
commodities. Diversifying and upgrading the export structure is important
for developing countries since primary commodity dependence is a major
concern in various low income countries. Our result suggest that AfT has
been effective in promoting recipient exports of manufactures. These findings
hold not only for trade relations with donor countries but also in south-south
trade with other developing countries.
The second part of my dissertation investigates the link between foreign aid
and FDI in more detail. Official development assistance (ODA) and foreign
direct investment (FDI) are widely perceived to be alternative means of sup-
plementing domestic savings and promoting economic development in low-
and middle-income countries. However, possible complementaries of aid and
FDI have received limited attention so far. Together with Julian Donaubauer
2
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and Peter Nunnenkamp, I examine whether aid specifically targeted at eco-
nomic infrastructure helps developing countries attract higher FDI inflows
through improving their endowment with infrastructure in transportation,
communication, energy, and finance. To measure infrastructure appropri-
ately, we construct comprehensive and comparable indices on the most rel-
evant components of economic infrastructure. An unobserved components
model is employed to cover the largest possible number of developing and
developed countries over the period 1990-20101. Chapter 5 provides details
on the construction, country rankings and possible applications of the in-
frastructure indices. Thus, by overcoming several data limitations, our new
global index can help to address the link between development assistance,
infrastructure and aid more systematically (chapter 6). By performing 3SLS
estimations we explicitly account for dependencies between the allocation
of sector-specific aid, the determinants of infrastructure, and the determi-
nants of FDI. We find strong and robust evidence that aid in infrastructure
is effective in improving the recipient countries’ endowment with infrastruc-
ture. Infrastructure consistently proves to be an important determinant of
developing countries’ attractiveness to FDI. Consequently, only aid targeted
at infrastructure needs promotes FDI indirectly through the infrastructure
channel. In addition, aid in infrastructure has direct effects on FDI.
Having established a positive link between aid and FDI, the last part of
my dissertation analyzes intra-firm reallocation effects of FDI in developing
countries. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries is as-
sociated with productivity growth of host country firms due to knowledge
and technology spillovers. The productivity-increasing channel via product
range optimization and product scope expansion in the aftermath of a for-
eign acquisition, however, has largely been ignored so far. Chapter 7 looks
explicitly at the effects of FDI on the product mix of multi-product firms
(MPF) in India to investigate this channel in detail. Access to developed
countries’ technologies and know-how through FDI affect the performance
by product scope expansion of foreign acquired companies. With the help
of a firm-product-level dataset of Indian manufacturing firms, I reveal that
foreign owned firms are associated with a higher product scope and a more
flexible manufacturing process allowing to produce more similar products
together. Using a doubly robust propensity score reweighted covariate ad-
justed regression to control for the selection bias associated with the entry
of foreign investors, I show that foreign acquired firms expand their product
range. FDI increases the probability to introduce new products, upgrade
products and drop unrelated products from their product portfolio. The
effect is most pronounced for majority and wholly-acquired foreign firms.
By analyzing the product-level dynamics within firms, I reveal an important
1We will extend our new global index in the future.
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micro-level channel of productivity increases after foreign acquisition.
Overall, the findings of my dissertation can be informative to policy makers
and researchers interested in the link between aid, trade, FDI and a countries
product structure. My research shows that the Aid-for-Trade initiative is
effective in enhancing trade with donors and other developing countries.
Further, aid targeted at the bottlenecks of foreign investors, in particular
targeted at infrastructure, helps to attract FDI inflows. FDI inflows, in
turn, induce higher product-level dynamic which are an important driver of
economic growth.
4
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Chapter 2
Who Benefits from Aid for
Trade? Comparing the Effects
on Recipient versus Donor
Exports
Philipp Hühnea, Birgit Meyerb, Peter Nunnenkampc
a Helmut-Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany
b University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany
c Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
Journal of Development Studies, 2014, 50(9): 1275-1288
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.903246
Abstract: Recent studies offer an ambiguous picture on the effectiveness
of foreign aid in strengthening the export capacity of recipient countries.
Moreover, the literature on aid for trade (AfT) has often neglected the fact
that exporters in the donor countries may be among the main beneficiaries.
We simultaneously estimate and compare the effects of AfT on trade in both
directions. We find that AfT increases recipient exports to donors as well
as recipient imports from donors. The first effect tends to dominate the
latter, which contradicts the sceptical view that donors grant AfT primarily
to promote their own export interests.
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Chapter 3
Does Aid for Trade from the
North promote South–South
trade?
Philipp Hühnea, Birgit Meyerb, Peter Nunnenkampc
a Helmut-Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany
b University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany
c Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
Applied Economics Letters, 2015, 21(17):1230-1233
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2014.922665
Abstract: Our empirical estimations indicate that Aid for Trade (AfT) granted
by OECD donors strengthens the trade relations of recipient countries with
other developing countries. By focusing on South–South trade, we mitigate
endogeneity concerns that have plagued analyses of trade between recipients
and donors of AfT.
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Chapter 4
Aid for Trade: Assessing the
Effects on Recipient Exports of
Manufactures and Primary
Commodities to Donors and
Non-donors
Philipp Hühnea, Birgit Meyerb, Peter Nunnenkampc
a Helmut-Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany
b University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany
c Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
2015, In: Handbook on the Economics of Foreign Aid, Mak Arvin and
Byron Lew (Eds.), Chapter 10: 141–161, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781783474592.00018
Abstract: Considering that primary commodity dependence continues to be
a major problem of various lower income countries, we analyze whether Aid
for Trade (AfT) has helped recipient countries upgrade and diversify their
exports. Estimating an asymmetric and aggregated gravity model, we find
that AfT has been effective in promoting recipient exports of manufactures –
whereas the effects on primary commodities are typically insignificant. These
findings hold not only for trade relations with donor countries but also in
south-south trade with other developing countries.
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Chapter 5
A New Global Index of
Infrastructure: Construction,
Rankings and Applications
Julian Donaubauera, Birgit Meyerb, Peter Nunnenkampc
a Helmut-Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany
b University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany
c Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
The World Economy, 2016, 39(2): 236–259
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/twec.12290
Abstract: We construct comprehensive and comparable indices on the most
relevant components of economic infrastructure. An unobserved components
model is employed to cover the largest possible number of developing and
developed countries over the period 1990-2010. We map major findings from
the new indices of infrastructure and provide country rankings, which we also
compare with subjective assessments of infrastructure in the World Economic
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. Finally, we exemplify possible ap-
plications related to trade and FDI. By overcoming several data limitations,
our new global index can help assess the links between infrastructure and
economic development more systematically.
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Chapter 6
Aid, Infrastructure, and FDI:
Assessing the Transmission
Channel with a New Index of
Infrastructure
Julian Donaubauera, Birgit Meyerb, Peter Nunnenkampc
a Helmut-Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany
b University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany
c Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
World Development, 2016, 78: 230–245
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.015
Abstract:Official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) are widely perceived to be alternative means of supplementing
domestic savings and promoting economic development in low- and middle-
income countries. However, possible complementarities of aid and FDI have
received limited attention so far. It remains open to debate whether aid could
render recipient countries more attractive to FDI by removing specific bottle-
necks that prevent higher FDI inflows. In particular, we raise the hypothesis
that aid specifically targeted at economic infrastructure helps developing
countries attract higher FDI inflows through improving their endowment
with infrastructure in transportation, communication, energy, and finance.
By performing 3SLS estimations we explicitly account for dependencies be-
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tween three structural equations on the allocation of sector-specific aid, the
determinants of infrastructure, and the determinants of FDI. We find strong
and robust evidence that aid in infrastructure is effective in improving the
recipient countries’ endowment with infrastructure. In sharp contrast, other
aid is not effective in improving infrastructure. Infrastructure consistently
proves to be an important determinant of developing countries’ attractiveness
to FDI. Consequently, only targeted aid promotes FDI indirectly through the
infrastructure channel. In addition, aid in infrastructure has direct effects
on FDI. It appears that foreign investors anticipate longer term effects of
aid on the country’s endowment with infrastructure and expect aid-financed
infrastructure to serve them particularly well.
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Chapter 7
Product Mix and Foreign
Ownership: Evidence from
India’s Investment
Liberalization
Birgit Meyera,b
a University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany
b Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
Abstract: Foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries is associ-
ated with productivity growth of host country firms due to knowledge and
technology spillovers. Little is known, however, how the presence of multi-
national enterprises affects the product mix and the manufacturing of more
advanced products by firms. This paper wants to fill this gap by exam-
ining the effects of foreign ownership and foreign ownership structures on
within firm reallocation processes. With the help of a firm-product-level
dataset of Indian manufacturing firms, I reveal that foreign owned firms are
associated with a higher product scope and a more flexible manufacturing
process allowing to produce more similar products together. Using a doubly
robust propensity score reweighted covariate adjusted regression to control
for the selection bias associated with the entry of foreign investors, I show
that foreign acquired firms expand their product range. FDI increases the
probability to introduce new products, upgrade products and drop unre-
lated products from their product portfolio. The effect is most pronounced
for majority and wholly-acquired foreign firms.
15
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1. Introduction 
A numerous amount of empirical and theoretical work on the effects of foreign investment liberalization 
(Borensztein et al, 1998; Markusen, 2004; Alfaro et al, 2004) has significantly contributed to our 
understanding how the entry of foreign investors can promote growth and spur development. For developing 
countries, trade expansions, technological and knowledge spillovers are typically identified as key 
determinants of substantial economic gains after opening the economy to foreign direct investments (FDI). 
Policies in developing countries have been designed in various ways to become more attractive for foreign 
investors. In India, for example, tax holidays and additional depreciation of 20 percent on new investments 
are promised to foreign investors (United Nations, 2000; Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2015).  
An extensive body of empirical literature shows the positive impact of FDI on productivity, trading activities, 
innovation and wages of host country ﬁrms (for example Harris and Robinson, 2003; Görg and Greenaway, 
2004; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009).1 This empirical work fits various theoretical models of multinational 
enterprises, either in the tradition of the knowledge capital model (Carr et al, 2001; Markusen, 2004) or the 
more recent models of heterogeneous firms (Helpman et al, 2004) which assume that multinationals have 
specific assets, technologies and knowledge which generate a productivity advantage.  
A most recent and promising extension to the firm heterogeneity literature takes into account heterogeneity 
not only at the firm level, but also at the product level. The pioneering work of Bernard et al (2007) and 
Bernard et al (2010) shows that US firms producing multiple products account for 90 percent of total output 
in manufacturing, and among those firms adding and dropping products is common.2 This prevalence of multi-
product firms (MPF), which can be found also in many developing countries, raises a number of new and 
exciting questions related to international trade. 
For example, Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), Eckel and Neary (2010), Iacovone and Javorcik (2010), Mayer 
et al (2014) and Bernard et al (2014) examine product-level dynamics within firms in the context of exporting 
behavior and trade liberalization. More productive firms export more products to more countries and have 
higher average product-country export flows. Goldberg et al (2010a) show that liberalizing tariffs in India is 
associated with an expansion of product scope. New product introductions are concentrated in sectors with 
disproportionally large input tariff declines that allow firms access to new, previously unavailable imported 
materials. Little is known, however, how the presence of multinational enterprises aﬀects the product mix and 
the manufacturing of more advanced products by ﬁrms.  
                                                 
1 This is mainly done by implementing methods from microeconometric program evaluation to estimate the direct treatment effect 
of being acquired by a foreign investor (the treatment) compared to non-treated domestic firms (the control group). 
2 Over 90 percent of US manufacturing firms add and/or drop a product over a given five-year interval. 
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By examining the productivity enhancing channel of FDI in detail, this paper contributes to the small but fast 
growing literature on product dynamics and international trade. Placing the production of some varieties 
abroad, foreign investors may alter the product mix of their local acquisition. Adopting new production 
technologies and realizing synergy effects might allow cost reduction, product innovation and product 
upgrading, which might alter the product mix. An expansion in the product scope is associated with higher 
firm productivity (Bernard et al 2010; Goldberg et al 2010b).  
Using a firm-product-level dataset of Indian manufacturing firms, I show that foreign owned firms are 
associated with a higher product scope and a more flexible manufacturing process allowing to produce more 
similar products together. To establish causality, I implement the so-called doubly robust estimator, a 
propensity score reweighting estimator combined with covariate adjustment, to account for the fact that foreign 
capital is generally invested in larger and more productive firms, which tend to produce a higher variety of 
products. This estimator has the advantage that it correctly identifies the average treatment effect of being 
acquired by a foreign investors even if either the propensity score or the conditional regression model are 
possibly misspecified (Wooldridge 2007; Girma et al , 2015). Further, distinguishing between different foreign 
entry modes allows to differentiate between the effects of minority and majority foreign acquisitions and the 
related technology spillovers on the product mix.    
My results suggest that firms acquired by foreign investors drastically restructure their product mix. Foreign 
acquired firms seem to skew their production towards better performing products, exploit higher economies 
of scale by churning unrelated product and introducing more varieties within their existing product lines. Firms 
become leaner in their product lines while introducing new varieties to their core product lines. Adopting new 
technologies, process and product innovation allows to reduce costs and upgrade products, while it 
simultaneously allows acquired firms to expand their product scope. The effect is most pronounced for 
majority and wholly-acquired firms. Directly after foreign acquisition, majority acquired firms increase their 
net extensive product margin by 37.2 percent compared to similar firms in purely domestic hands.  
Thus, by exploring the impact of changes in ownership on MPFs in a developing country, this paper contributes 
to the literature by providing evidence of a further micro-level channel through which FDI promotes 
productivity growth. Its novelty lies in testing how access to new technologies and know-how through FDI 
affect the performance by product scope expansion of acquired companies.3 Looking explicitly at intra-firm 
reallocation at the product level, this paper is – to the best of my knowledge – one of the first ones linking 
foreign ownership and foreign ownership structure to within firm reallocation processes. Related to my work 
                                                 
3 Previous literature suggests that foreign affiliates have a superior performance (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Arnold and Javorcik, 
2009) and tend to export higher-unit-value products (Harding and Javorcik, 2012; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010). Quality increases 
in both homogeneous and differentiated goods might be facilitated in presence of FDI inflows into developing countries.  
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is the study by Harding and Javorcik (2012) who show that FDI has the potential for raising the quality of 
exports in developing countries in both absolute terms and in terms of closing the gap to the quality frontier. 
FDI speeds up growth by facilitating the manufacturing of more sophisticated products by local firms (Eck 
and Huber, 2016).  
My findings can be informative to policy makers and researchers interested in the link between the structure 
of a firm, FDI, productivity and economic growth.4 Innovation and productivity improvements within firms 
account for a large fraction of productivity gains. Moreover, variety-loving consumers benefit not only from 
new products, but also from product and process innovation.5 Understanding the dynamics of introducing new 
varieties at the firm level and the innovation process constitutes a first step in understanding how a country 
can upgrade its product structure and what policies, if any, can stimulate this process. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature on MPFs, 
international trade and FDI. Section 3 describes the firm level data set. Section 4 presents characteristics of 
MPFs in India. Section 5 empirically analyzes the effect of FDI on the product mix. The last section concludes. 
2. Multi-product Firms and International Trade 
A new strand of the MPF literature considers explanations of productivity changes arising from intra-firm 
resource reallocation in the presence of product heterogeneity. Recent empirical as well as theoretical evidence 
suggest an important role of international trade for within firm reallocation of resources between products. 
Intra-firm dynamics affect productivity beyond the firm level: product churning affects overall growth at the 
industry and economy level. As shown by Bernard et al (2010) product switching was the driving force behind 
the U.S. output growth between 1972 and 1997.  
The theoretical literature has developed various models incorporating heterogeneity at the product level, and 
relates them to international trade (Bernard et al, 2007; Feenstra and Ma, 2008; Baldwin and Gu, 2009; 
Arkolakis and Muendler, 2010; Eckel and Neary, 2010; Nocke and Yeaple, 2014; Mayer et al, 2014). These 
models capture endogenous dynamics across firms (for example exporting activities undertaken by some firms 
versus the exclusive focus on the domestic market by others) as well as within firms (for example some 
products being exported but not others). The aggregate responses to policy changes emerge as a combination 
of these multiple dynamics within and across firms.  
MPFs produce a range of imperfectly substitutable products. Varieties within a firm’s product line are typically 
linked on the cost side through a flexible manufacturing technology (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Eckel, 2009; 
                                                 
4 See an emerging literature started by Hausman et al (2007). 
5 In his revolutionizing work, Krugman (1976) models how countries could gain from trade through import of new varieties. Broda 
and Weinstein (2006) show that the increase in product varieties has contributed to large welfare gains in the United States over the 
period between 1972 and 2001.  
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Eckel and Neary, 2010). Firms choose their optimal number of products by balancing the net profits from 
producing a new variety against the cost of cannibalizing their sales of other varieties. Demand and cost 
linkages between the varieties produced induce a trade-off between product and process innovation, which is 
particularly important for multinational MPFs. Models of MPFs for example by Bernard et al (2010, 2011), 
Eckel and Neary (2010), Nocke and Yeaple (2014), and Damijan et al (2014) demonstrate how either trade 
participation or trade liberalization affect firms’ product scope. Increased import competition and strong 
competition in export markets push companies to rationalize their product scope towards their core 
competencies and better performing products, which in turn improves firms’ performance. Mayer et al (2014) 
stress the importance of the repercussions of the trading environment on the product mix of firms.  
Despite this recognition for the relevance of the intra-firm channel related to international trade, there has been 
less attention so far on how changes in ownership affect product scope and product innovation. An exception 
are Bernard et al (2010) who show that in the U.S. most of the firms engaging in merger and acquisition 
activities also alter their product mix, half of those firms even switch sectors. However, Bernard et al (2010) 
do not investigate further the extent of ownership changes on within firm changes and innovation activities. 
In particular, they do not distinguish different types of merger and acquisitions, and do not take into account 
that foreign acquisitions might be different to domestic merger and acquisition activities. Distinguishing 
between different effects of domestic and multinational merger and acquisition activities is of particular 
importance for developing countries: cheaper raw materials, lower labor cost, lower transaction costs and 
reduced trade costs are major motives of international mergers and acquisitions.  
These cost advantages of developing countries might induce multinational MPFs to place the production of 
some of their varieties abroad. Multinational enterprises tend to fragment their production across countries to 
exploit factor price differences. Foreign investors seeking lower production costs vertically integrate in 
particular firms producing intermediate goods into their global value chain. Thus, by placing the production 
of some products to developing countries, FDI might induce changes in the product mix of an acquired 
company. The engagement of foreign investors in developing countries potentially affects the product mix and 
productivity of firms due to quality and quantity adjustments, technological spillovers and skill upgrading. 
Foreign owners might extend the product scope by adding varieties to the existing product range of acquired 
companies. As stressed by Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001), analogues to the Brander-Krugman insight, foreign 
owners might accept a reduced rate of return on new varieties produced by their acquired partner abroad since 
trade barriers protect parts of the products from the cannibalization effect.6 Knowledge and technology 
spillovers to the acquired firms might facilitate product innovation and process upgrading. Superior technology 
                                                 
6 Producing products abroad enhances trade, in form of exports to new locations and in form of reverse imports, opposed to the usual 
trade displacement of exports with local sales of foreign affiliates.  
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of a foreign investor enhances the competitive position of the acquired firm in a developing country. Foreign 
investors are likely to engage with local partners whose level of technology is lower than their own. In a 
country like India, where the majority of investors are from more advanced countries like Singapore, the 
United States, Japan or Germany, there might be a huge technology gap.7 Hence, there might be a strong 
potential for improvements in the production process and the production technology.  
Access to know-how or patents for new products or processes allows to add new products to the product mix. 
Flach and Irlacher (2015) model the role of access to foreign markets in process8 and product innovation: in 
larger market, firms will invest in new products and production processes. Iacovone and Javorcik (2010), 
Harding and Javorcik (2012) and Eckel et al (2015) show that the presence of FDI lead to higher unit-value 
exports. Multinationals using a country as export platform might produce either more sophisticated or higher-
unit-value goods than those previously exported. Since foreign acquired firms are internationally more 
integrated, they are able to differentiate their products more across qualities and locations.  
Further, according to Bloom et al (2012) productivity increasing activities can be related to the management 
structure. Forward or backward integration through vertical mergers reshapes the organizational structure. 
Transferring superior management skills to their acquired partners, foreign owned firms operate more 
efficiently and new production capacities are created in the host country. For these reasons, I hypothesize that 
a foreign partnership reduces a varieties fixed cost. By introducing a new product to an existing established 
product line, firms might amortize sunk costs related to innovation and establishing a brand for the respective 
product line. 
FDI could encourage acquired firms as well to drop products. Changes in market orientation induced by 
foreign owners might lead to product dropping of internationally and nationally non-competitive products.  
Increased international competition, usually following trade and investment liberalization, forces MPFs to 
optimize their product range, by focusing on their core competency and dropping marginal high-cost varieties 
(Bernard et al, 2007; Eckel and Neary, 2010). Firms typically have a core competency in the production of 
specific product lines; outside these core competencies the production process is less efficient. To internalize 
the benefits of flexible manufacturing, products need to be closely related in their production process. Thus, 
foreign investors might have incentives to drop unrelated products from the product portfolio. Eckel and Neary 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, Prowess does not have immanent information on the origin of the respective foreign acquirer. Nevertheless, 
according to the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the top investing countries  FDI equity inflow into India are from 
Mauritius, Singapore, the U.K., Japan, the Netherlands, the U.S., Germany, Cyprus, France and Switzerland. These top ten countries 
account for more than 85 percent of total FDI inflows from 2000 to 2014.  (see 
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/FDI_Statistics/FDI_Statistics.aspx,  10/02/2016) 
8 Process innovation leads to higher economies of scale (Dhingra, 2013). 
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(2010) show that globalization further increases the pressure to reduce costs which in turn reduces a firms 
product scope and its diversification across products.  
Firms may decide to expand their product range by adding new varieties to their product portfolio or drop 
marginal products from their product mix to lower their production costs. The net effect of restructuring 
processes following a foreign acquisition is a priori unclear.  
The degree of foreign partnership might play a role in determining the net effect on the product mix. As 
Javorcik and Saggi (2010) show, multinationals with high levels of technology prefer to wholly acquire their 
affiliates rather than initiating joint ventures. This higher technology may arguably translate into stronger 
technology upgrading, process and product innovation activities of the acquisition targets. Further, foreign 
owners are more likely to integrate wholly-owned affiliates completely into their international production 
network, transforming the product mix of their acquired firm according to their needs and using a developing 
country like India as “cheaper” production platform. However, for partially-owned firms, which operated pre-
acquisition using lower levels of technology, there would be a higher technology gap between the target and 
the acquirer, hence, a higher level of technology and skill upgrading would be possible after the acquisition, 
altering the product mix drastically. Further, foreign firms might chose to engage in firms with an excessive 
product scope and an unbalanced product mix only with minority ownership.  
3. Data 
The product-wise firm-level information is from the Prowess database collected by the Centre for the 
Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess contains information primarily from income statements 
and annual reports of publicly listed companies. The data spans from 1989 to 2013, thus, it includes the period 
of India’s investment liberalization phase. Prowess provides detailed firm-level information for a panel of 
medium and large manufacturing firms accounting for around 70 percent of economic activity in India’s formal 
industrial sector (see Goldberg et al, 2010a, b).9 The panel structure of Prowess enables within and across firm 
comparisons of restructuring activities and performance changes over time. Though the panel is unbalanced, 
firms are usually observed for a continuum of years after entering the database. In total, I have more than 
78,575 observations of more than 9,422 firms. 
Due to the 1956 Companies Act to disclose product-level information on capacities, production and sales in 
their annual reports, a firm’s product mix can be traced over time. Product-level information is available for 
about 80 percent of the manufacturing firms and the product-wise sales comprise 98 percent of the individual 
                                                 
9 Since foreign investors prefer to engage in partnerships with larger firms, the absence of small firms in the Prowess is not expected 
to alter my results.  
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reported manufacturing output.10 Since product-level information on sales and quantity are reported for each 
product, Prowess is particularly well suited to analyze the effects of ownership changes on the product mix 
and product quality. Thus, with this dataset the underlying mechanism of firm-level adjustments in response 
to ownership changes that are typically hidden in other data sources can be analyzed while not being prone to 
measurement issues arising at the product level.  
The definition of a product is based on the CMIE’s internal product classification which builds on the Indian 
Trade Classification and Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. The internal CMIE product 
classification can be mapped to the Indian National Industrial Classification (NIC) 2008 which is comparable 
to the International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) Revision 4 up to the four-digit level. This mapping 
allows me to assess product disaggregation and diversification at a very detailed level. There are 1729 products 
(at the five-digit product level) linked to 113 four-digit NIC industries across 23 sectors (two-digit NIC codes). 
The product coverage is similar to the U.S. (see Bernard et al, 2010)11. Goldberg et al (2010b) show that 
products vary substantially in terms of how they are produced both within sectors and across sectors. 
Products are further classified according to their end use into intermediate goods (capital and intermediates) 
and final goods (consumer goods, durables and nondurables) based on the Broad Economic Categories (BEC), 
Revision 4.12 I distinguish between these two categories since the affiliation to a multinational enterprise might 
affect the scope of intermediate and final good production differently.  
The Prowess database provides detailed information on the ownership and entity type of a corporation. Firms 
with foreign capital participation are defined as firms in which the share of subscribed capital (equity) owned 
by foreign investors is equal to at least 10 percent.13 Until 1991, Indian policy makers conducted a very 
restrictive trade regime, with high nominal tariffs and strict limitations to FDI. The protectionist License Raj 
favored more the development of large family-owned corporation than international active enterprises, while 
                                                 
10 Like Goldberg et al (2010a), I cross-checked this information. Since product-level information and overall sales information are 
provided in different data modules, this can be validated. The fiscal year ends usually in March in India, such that a particular year 
refers to the fiscal year-end that occurs in the following March. Several companies report different year end values. In order to render 
all companies comparable, companies with a year end up to July are assumed to refer to the previous year’s result. Further, products 
deviating from their usual production cycle in one year (for example only 3 month instead of 12 month) are dropped to ensure 
comparability.   
11 The definition of a product is slightly more detailed than the definition used by Bernard et al (2010) for U.S. manufacturing data. 
Their data contains approximately 1500 products, defined as five-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, across 455 
four-digit SIC industries. At the most disaggregated level, Prowess contains in total 3820 different products in the manufacturing 
sector. An example for the product classification of Prowess is given in Table A1 in the appendix.  
12 The matching of BEC and ISIC codes is done using the respective correspondence tables of the United Nations Statistics Division 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regot.asp?Lg=1, 03/01/2016). Commodities from BEC categories 31 (primary fuels and 
lubricants), 52 (other transport equipment) and 7 (goods not elsewhere specified) cannot be unequivocally categorizes as final or 
intermediate good. These commodities are therefore not included in the separate analysis of final and intermediate goods.  
13 I supplement this data with information on the ownership type of firms for firms that have missing information. In detail, I consider 
firms that are classified as privately Indian owned to have zero percent foreign equity and privately foreign-owned firms to have 
100 percent foreign equity. 
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foreign capital was highly regulated. A balance-of-payments crisis following the rising oil price in the wake 
of the Gulf war forced the Indian government to drastically liberalize their economy as part of a structural 
adjustment program of the International Monetary Fund in 1991. Since then, the Indian government has 
abandoned its extremely restrictive trade policies, reduced its nominal tariffs and non-tariff barriers, delicensed 
products and opened up the economy to foreign investors. The aim of the reform was to increase domestic 
competition while simultaneously becoming internationally more competitive. A more favorable environment 
for global expansion was created. A significant inflow of FDI in India followed. Large corporations dominated 
the internationalization process of Indian firms (Sauvant et al, 2010). In particular, since the end of the 1990s 
FDI inflows have gained momentum.14 Thus, the investment liberalization offers a unique setting to observe 
the effects of foreign acquisitions over time and for a large number of firms. Wholly-owned foreign enterprises 
dominate the FDI distribution. Nevertheless, a sizable number of firms receive only a small share (less than 
25 percent) of foreign equity.   
Since acquisitions with high foreign ownership shares might have different operational implications than 
acquisitions with rather low foreign involvement, I follow Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) and Girma et al 
(2015) and use  different foreign ownership categories. Since previously existing restrictions on the foreign 
ownership degree had been lifted in course of the investment liberalization, the causal effects of different 
forms of foreign acquisitions on the product scope and the product mix can be identified. To be able to identify 
possible impacts of minority, majority and full ownership, I consider four foreign ownership categories. A 
firm with a foreign capital share lower than 25 percent has only a small minority of foreign involvement while 
firms with a foreign equity share higher than or equal to 25 percent but lower than 50 percent are regarded as 
minority foreign owned.15 Firms with at least 50 percent but lower than 100 percent foreign shares form the 
third category of firms with majority foreign ownership. The fourth and last category are wholly-acquired 
foreign firms that is firms with 100 percent foreign equity.16 Full ownership is the dominant ownership type 
of foreign investors. Majority foreign control accounts for 14.4 percent of firms with foreign involvement 
between 2000 and 2013. Joint ventures with minority foreign control is chosen by 10.8 percent of foreign 
investors. Local firms attracting a low level of foreign capital account for 11.2 percent of all firms which 
receive FDI. Due to lack of data availability, the different foreign ownership categories can only be used after 
1999, until 1999 I can only distinguish between domestic and foreign ownership 
                                                 
14 See Table A 3.  
15 I distinguish between minority and small minority foreign owned since pre-liberalization a maximum share of 40 percent of 
foreign shareholding was allowed, but only with governmental approval. The reform itself was unanticipated by Indian firms were 
suspicious about FDI. The protectionist License Raj fueled sceptics against foreign equity among domestic firms (Sauvant et al, 
2010).      
16 Table A 3 in the appendix shows the distribution of foreign acquired firm by year. 
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4. Characteristics of Indian Multi-product Firms  
MPFs dominate the economy not only in the US, but as well in India. Table 1 brakes down the distribution of 
MPFs and domestic and foreign owned firms across my sample period. Though MPFs represent a minority of 
firms in India, they account for the majority of total manufacturing output. MPFs operate often across multiple 
industries and sectors. In alignment with the observation that foreign investors are more productive, foreign 
owned firms have a broader product range than purely domestic firms. Looking only at foreign firms in India, 
it becomes apparent that the majority of foreign firms are MPFs. Only 36 percent of all foreign owned firms 
are single product firms. Foreign owned MPFs account for 93 percent of the manufacturing output of all 
foreign owned firms in India. Further, in line with the theory by Mayer et al (2014) and Bernard et al (2010), 
I observe that more productive firms produce more diversified products and operate in more sectors. On 
average a domestic firms produces 4.1 products while foreign owned firms produce on average 5.6 products. 
The average number of products produced per firm is increasing after the investment liberalization in 1992. 
Figure 1 shows that the average product scope increases drastically from 1996 onwards, simultaneously with 
more FDI inflows. While product and sector diversification was raising, in particular for foreign firms, purely 
domestic standalone as well as private groups tend to concentrate their products more after the foreign 
investment activities in India gained momentum from 1996 onwards. Compared to domestic firms, foreign 
owned firms seem to be more active in changing their product mix. The descriptive Table 2 reveals that over 
a five year horizon not even half of all domestic firms engage in product switching activities, while three 
quarters of all foreign owned firms engage in product adding as well as in product dropping.  
5. Investment Liberalization, Product Switching and Foreign Ownership 
The following empirical analysis focuses on the effects of foreign ownership on the product scope and product 
switching behavior of MPFs in India. India’s investment liberalization offers an ideal framework to investigate 
the impact of being acquired by a foreign investor. 
To analyze the impact of foreign ownership on the product mix, I first look at correlations between foreign 
ownership and the product scope. A baseline model accounting for firm heterogeneity assesses the potential 
premium of being foreign owned on the product range, product differentiation, and the scope of intermediate 
and final goods. To identify the causal effects of a foreign acquisition, I set up a difference-in-difference 
approach in a second step. Precisely, I use a doubly robust propensity score reweighted covariate adjusted 
regression, the so-called doubly robust estimator,  to account for potential selection of foreign investors into 
more productive firms with higher product scope. 
Since process and product innovation activities are particularly related to product adding and product 
upgrading, I look as robustness check at changes in innovation activities and product quality.  
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5.1. Foreign Ownership and the Product Scope 
Empirical model 
To explore the differences between foreign and domestic ownership on the extensive product margin, I 
estimate the following equation:  
ln(𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡) = β0 + 𝛽𝑓 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,   (1) 
where 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the number of products manufactured by firm i operating in industry j at time t. foreign is a 
foreign ownership dummy taking on the value one if a firm is foreign owned. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝑓, 
which captures the semi elasticity of a firm’s product scope with respect to foreign ownership. Firm fixed 
effects (αi) to control for time invariant firm characteristics, industry fixed effects (αj) to account for industry 
specific heterogeneity17, and year fixed effects (αt) to capture unobserved aggregate shocks, are included. 𝜀 is 
the error term.  
Further, to account for the fact that larger, more established, more productive firms usually have a broader 
product scope, the vector 𝑋 controls for firm characteristics like productivity measured by total factor 
productivity (TFP)18, size19, age and a dummy equal to one if the firm is (partly) state owned. State owned 
enterprises (SOE) enjoy in many instances privileges and immunities not available to their competitors. These 
advantages, which are not based on better performance, superior efficiency, better technology or superior 
management skills, reduce the threat of market competition for SOEs (Boardman and Vining, 1989, Bartels 
and Harrison, 2005). Inefficiencies and low incentives for cost reduction in SOEs lead to missing product 
cannibalization inducing an inefficient high product scope.20  
Main results 
Table 3 reports the main results based on equation (1). The coefficients of the control variables are mainly as 
expected. Being more productive, larger and having a “competiveness advantage” by being a SOE 
significantly increases the product range. The age of a firm has, however, no statistically significant impact on 
the product scope. Column (3) and (4) include a squared term of productivity to account for a possible 
cannibalization effect, as argued by Feenstra and Ma (2008), Eckel and Neary (2010) and Hottman et al (2016). 
Since productive firms with a high market share are hurt more by additional cost that occur by introducing a 
                                                 
17 Firms switch their main industries. The main industry a firm is operating in, that is the industry accounting for most of a firms 
sales and most of its products, is used to account for industry specific characteristics.  
18 TFP is constructed following the methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Please see the appendix for details on the 
construction of TFP.  
19 Size is approximated by log output.  
20 According to property right theory, private enterprises should perform more profitable and efficiently than public enterprises (see 
for example Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Public choice theorists (for example Levy, 1987) stress that X-inefficiency factors arise 
from public ownership per se.  
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new product line, the incentive to add more products are weak for firms with high market shares. Therefore, 
Feenstra and Ma (2008) assume an inverted U-shape relationship between productivity and the range of 
varieties produced. My result confirm this cannibalization behavior: the coefficient of productivity is 
significantly positive, while its squared term is significantly negative, and the estimated maximum is inside 
the data range. Firms with very high productivity face a substantial trade-off when introducing an additional 
product.  
 Turning to the variable of interest: the coefficient on foreign ownership is positive and statistically significant. 
Foreign ownership is associated with a higher scope of production than purely domestically owned firms. The 
estimate in column (1) implies that the premium of being foreign is related to a 9 percent higher product scope. 
Controlling for productivity and other firm characteristics in column (2), and (3) of Table 3 reduces the effect 
of foreign ownership. The coefficients of foreign ownership are statistically significant and economically 
meaningful: around 5 percent of product expansion can be attributed to foreign ownership. Column (4) restricts 
the sample to the first decade after the investment liberalization. The impact of foreign ownership for the 
reduced sample up to 2003 is of similar size, thus, the product scope premium of foreign ownership is persistent 
and seems not to be bounded to the immediate phase after the investment liberalization. 
During the period of my analysis, the share of foreign owned firms increased by 11.4 percentage points 
between 1993 and 2013, while firms increased their product scope on average by 26.0 percent. Thus, my 
estimates imply that the foreign investment liberalization connected to the entrance of new foreign investors 
account for around 20.1 percent of the observed expansion in firms’ product scope21. This can be compared to 
the findings of Goldberg et al (2010a)22. Their result implies that the reduction of import tariffs account for 
approximately 31 percent of the expansion in product scope in India. Goldberg et al (2010b) estimated that the 
net product expansion accounted for 25.2 percent of manufacturing output growth between 1989 and 2003 in 
India. Taking their estimate at face value and reproducing my estimation according to their sample size (see 
Table 3, column (4)), my estimates suggest that if India’s investment liberalization and the following inflow 
of FDI impacted growth only through the expansion of the product scope, the increasing inflow of foreign 
capital contributed 5.6 percent to the overall manufacturing growth between 1989 and 2003.23 This suggest 
                                                 
21 The calculation is based on the estimates in Table 3 column (3). Table A 3 in the appendix shows the number of foreign acquisitions 
by year after India’s investment liberalization campaign in 1992.  
22 Goldberg et al (2010a,b) use as well the Indian Prowess dataset.  
23 The estimate are based on Table 3, column (4).  Foreign investment liberalization connected to the entrance of new foreign 
investors account for around 22.7 percent of the observed expansion in firms’ product scope over the period from 1989 to 2003. 
Thus, combining this with the estimate of Goldberg (2010b), the contribution of foreign investors through the net extensive product 
margin on manufacturing output growth is calculated by 0.227*0.252. Nevertheless, considering also other impacts of FDI, for 
example on wages or productivity spillover to local firms, this constitutes only a lower bound of the potential impact of FDI on 
manufacturing growth.  
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that India’s trade and investment liberalization reform led to dynamic gains as these new introduced products 
fed into the domestic economy.  
Table 4 shows additional results, including international trading activities. I include an import dummy equal 
to one if a firm imports raw materials and an export dummy equal to one if a firm exports a share of its 
products. Including exporting and importing activities and interacting them with foreign ownership may 
provide a hint of the position of the acquired firm in the global value chain. According to the theory (Bernard 
et al, 2007; Eckel and Neary, 2010), lower costs of importing goods from abroad will lead to a decline in firm 
scope as firms drop their marginal varieties sold on the domestic market. Firms importing raw materials, 
nevertheless, rather expand their product range. Importing raw materials from abroad is associated with an 
increase in product scope by around 3.8 percent (see Table 4, column (1) and (2)). This result might be driven 
by the input tariff reduction in the 1990s. As Goldberg et al (2010a) show, the input tariffs reduction in India 
drastically increased the number of varieties imported as well as the number of products produced. The size 
of the coefficient of my import dummy mirrors the effect of the Indian import tariff reduction found by 
Goldberg et al (2010a)24. The coefficient on importing is lower for foreign owners compared to domestic firms, 
though the difference to domestic firms is statistically not significant.  
Being an exporter is associated with increases in the product scope by around 10 percent. The effect is more 
pronounced for firms receiving foreign capital. Many foreign investors potentially increase the market size of 
the acquired firm by using India as production platform to sell parts of their products abroad or back home. 
Splitting the products into intermediate goods and final goods allows to take into account different motives of 
FDI. Table 4, column (3) and (4) indicate a potential vertical integration motive of foreign investors, seeking 
lower production costs in a developing country like India. Foreign owned firm which produce mainly 
intermediate goods have a larger product scope than foreign investors with rather horizontal motives. I only 
find a significant effect of foreign ownership on product expansion for intermediate goods. Firms receiving 
foreign capital expand their product scope if the acquired firm mainly produces intermediate goods. Foreign 
ownership, however, does not seem to alter the product scope of final goods.  
Sensitivity and robustness test 
These results are robust to the choice of productivity measures and alternative estimation approaches. Table 
5, column (1) and (2) report sensitivity checks with respect to the measure of productivity. Productivity is 
                                                 
24 Goldberg et al (2010a) find that a 10-percentage fall in tariffs results in a 3.2 percent expansion of a firm’s product scope. This 
evidence suggest that other industrial policies like delicensing, and the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers which 
simultaneously affected the Indian economy do not bias my result. Unfortunately, I do not have the respective data on input and 
output tariffs, non-tariff barriers and delicensing of products to account for these policies directly.  
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alternatively approximated here by labor productivity.25 The results are of similar magnitude as before. Table 
5, column (3) to (5), report the result using count data models. The specification in column (3) is estimated 
using a Poisson model, with standard errors corrected for overdispersion, and in column (4) and (5) using a 
Negative Binomial count data model.26 Quantitatively and qualitatively these models confirm my results. The 
effect of foreign ownership and its magnitude is remarkably stable across specifications, which provides 
further reassurance that the baseline model is not driven by model misspecification.  
5.1.1. Varieties and Product Diversification 
Product expansion can take place by expanding existing product lines at the core competence and by creating 
new varieties outside the core competency of a firm. To proxy the relatedness of products, I consider the five-
digit product level as product line, and products within these different product lines as varieties. Estimating 
equation (1) using the average number of varieties within certain product lines as dependent variable, reveals 
that foreign owned firms are producing more varieties than domestic owned firms. Table 6 column (1) shows 
that foreign ownership is associated with a variety premium of 3.9 percent. Thus, foreign owned firms might 
use a more flexible manufacturing technology than domestic owned firms. To realize these synergy effects, 
similar manufacturing technology can be used in the production processes of similar goods. A better 
technology provided by more technological advanced foreign investors further facilitates the production of 
more diverse varieties. Thus, in markets in which products can be vertically differentiated, foreign owned 
firms may offer different qualities in equilibrium which allows them to relax price competition while 
maximizing profits.  
Note the negative significant semi-elasticity of SOE on the number of varieties within product lines. In 
combination with the previous finding that SOEs seem to produce significant more products, the surprising 
relation of SOE production implies that these products seem to be quite diverse and, in contrast to highly 
competitive foreign owned firms, the manufacturing process might not be aligned to capture synergy effects.  
Further evidence that foreign owned firms concentrate their product scope more around their core competency 
can be found by looking at the number of industries and sectors MPFs are operating in. Despite the higher 
number of products and varieties foreign owned firms produce, foreign ownership is not correlated with the 
number of industries and significantly negative associated with a lower number of sectors (see Table 6, column 
(2) and (3)). In Table 6, column (4), I look at product diversification directly. Product diversification is 
                                                 
25 Since Prowess does not include reliable employment data, the number of employees needed to derive labor productivity is 
approximated using the available information on average wages per employee by industry and year. 
26 Since underlying distributional assumption of the Poisson model that the mean is equal to the variance seems to be violated due 
to the skewed distribution of the number of products, the standard errors of the estimated Poisson model are corrected for 
overdispersion. Nevertheless, the Negative Binomial count data model is preferred here over the Poisson model since it provides a 
better fit according to the goodness of fit test and the Akaike's Information Criterion. 
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measured by the Berry-Herfindahl-Index (Berry, 1971), 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 1 −  ∑ (𝑠𝑛)
2𝑁
𝑛=1 , where 𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁] is the 
number of products the firm produces, and 𝑠𝑛 is the share of a firm’s number of product lines relative to the 
total number of products.27 Foreign owned firms are associated with a higher concentration of products across 
different product branches. Thus, this confirms that foreign owned firms tend to produce more similar varieties 
together.  
To highlight possible co-production of products firms tend to produce together, Table 7 follows Bernard et al 
(2010) and reports the average annual frequency (in hundreds) with which firms co-produce products within 
and across sectors. Products with dark blue and dark orange shading are significantly more often produced 
together than expected assuming that product lines are independent from each other.28 Like Bernard et al 
(2010) showed for the US, also in India there are sectors for which the probability that a firm produces a 
product in the row sector conditional on production of a product in the column sector is relatively high within 
sectors as well as across sectors that appear related (for example Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, or Computer 
Manufacturing and Electrical Equipment). In general, Table 7 confirms that firms do not choose their product 
mix randomly. This behavior is more pronounced for foreign firms. Industries with dark orange shading are 
identified further as those in which foreign owned firms produce within and across industries not only 
significantly more products together, but also produce significantly more products together than domestic 
firms.29 Within industries and across related industries foreign firms co-produce significantly more products 
than domestic firms. For example, 640 foreign owned firms co-produce products categorized in the Electrical 
Equipment and Computer sector. This number of co-products is statistically higher than expected and foreign 
firms produce more goods in these sectors together than domestic firms. Co-production in less related sectors 
like Beverages and Automobiles occurs significantly less frequently than expected and relatively less frequent 
under foreign ownership than under domestic ownership (indicated by light orange shading). Thus, foreign 
acquired firms seem to focus their product lines significantly stronger around their core competence. Foreign 
owners seems to particularly dominate co-production in technological intensive sectors.  
5.2.  Product Switching and Ownership Changes 
In the following, I use a doubly robust estimator to obtain the causal effect on product switching after a firm 
was acquired by a foreign investor. To identify the effect of foreign acquisitions following the investment 
liberalization on the changes in the product mix, the following analysis is confined to firms purely domestic 
in 1992. Of those, I define a treatment group as those firms that attracted foreign capital for the first time 
                                                 
27 The index is normalized and constrained between 0 and 1 and increasing in product diversification. 
28 See the appendix for more details.  
29 This is tested by a simple t-test comparing the relative frequency of observed co-production within and across industry for domestic 
and foreign firms.  
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between 1993 and 201330. Those firms that remained in domestic hands during the observation period form 
my control group, necessary to construct the respective counterfactual that firms recently acquired by foreign 
investors had remained in domestic hands.31 Further, I impose that a firm has to be observed for at least four 
consecutive years in the sample. This panel allows me to control for pre-acquisition characteristics and 
evaluate the post-treatment effects on the year of acquisition and three periods following the acquisition. Table 
A 5 in the appendix provides summary statistics of pre-acquisition characteristics of the control group and the 
treatment group, and shows the necessity to correct for the pre-treatment differences using propensity score 
reweighting. Acquired firms are slightly more productive, younger, larger, less leveraged, pay higher wages, 
are more integrated into the international markets and are less often SOEs.  
I consider two set-ups with two different treatment variables: the acquisition of foreign ownership (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛) 
and the degree of foreign ownership (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑).32 The treatment variable of the degree of foreign ownership 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑  is equal to one for all degrees 𝑑 ∈ [1, … ,4] if firm i that has been in domestic hands up to year t-1 
is acquired by a foreign owner at time t with an investment share categorized as  
𝑑 = {
1, 𝐹𝐷𝐼 ≥   10% ∧  𝐹𝐷𝐼 <   25%
2, 𝐹𝐷𝐼 ≥   25% ∧  𝐹𝐷𝐼 <   50%
3, 𝐹𝐷𝐼 ≥   50% ∧  𝐹𝐷𝐼 < 100%
 4, 𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 100% 
  . 
In the following, I first look at the net effect of product switching and then in more detail at the decision to 
add or drop products from the product scope, depending on the foreign ownership degree.  
5.2.1. Net Effect of Product Switching 
Empirical framework 
To evaluate the average treatment effect (ATE) of foreign ownership degree d, the difference between the 
mean outcome of all firms which received foreign capital within one category of foreign ownership, d=1,…,4, 
and the mean outcome of firms had they not become foreign owned needs to be estimated, that means 𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
𝐸[𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜏
𝑑 − 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜏
0 ]. Since investors choose their foreign investment locations according to specific firm 
characteristics, simply comparing the post-treatment effect on the product mix of the treatment and control 
group is problematic. To avoid a possible selection bias and a biased identification due to either model 
misspecification or missing confounders, I use the doubly-robust estimator which combines propensity score 
                                                 
30 Using different ownership degrees as treatment variable limits the sample to the 1999 to 2013 period.   
31 In general, in presence of multiple treatments, any pairwise combination of categories can be considered to estimate the desired 
treatment effect. 
32 For notational brevity, in the following I explain the estimation procedure in more detail for the degree of foreign ownership. The 
procedure is analogues for foreign as treatment variable. The propensity scores are derived from a logit model in case 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 is 
the treatment variable.  
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reweighting with covariate adjusted regressions including a treatment and a function of the confounders. The 
doubly-robust estimator has the advantage of combining the selection correction from propensity score 
matching as well as confounders adjusted regressions (Wooldridge, 2007; Lechner, 2002). Further, the doubly-
robust estimator is robust to model misspecification or biased propensity scores. Even if either the outcome 
model or the treatment model is incorrectly specified, the doubly-robust approach estimates the effect 
consistently and correctly. 
The net effect on changes in the product mix is estimated by the propensity score-weighted regression  
ln(𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜏) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑 +  Γ(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + μijt+τ        (2) 
for all degrees of ownership, 𝑑 𝜖 [1,4], with error term μ. The vector X includes, similar as before, productivity, 
a squared term of productivity, a dummy for SOE, age of firm i operating in industry j and a full set of firm, 
industry and time fixed effects. Due to the results of the previous section, I am confident that my reweighted 
covariate adjusted regression does not suffer from severe misspecification.  
The doubly robust estimator requires to reweight the observation of the treatment group by the inverse 
propensity score 𝑝𝑑 and the control group, respectively, by 
1
1− 𝑝𝑑
. To obtain the propensity score, I estimate 
the determinants of the degree of foreign ownership using an ordered logistic regression from which I will 
generate the respective propensity score 𝑝𝑑.33 The propensity score is derived from an ordered logit model of 
foreign ownership structure based on the four ownership categories d=1,…,4. The propensity scores are 
computed according to Lechner (2002) and Girma et al (2015). The propensity score sets each predicted 
probability for each ownership degree, 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑 , relative to the base category of purely domestic ownership:  
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑 =
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑 +𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡
0  .     (3) 
The ordered logit model is estimated conditional on 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡−1, where Z is a vector of pre-treatment covariates that 
are assumed to impact the choice of foreign ownership acquisition and the respective degree. In my model, 
the vector Z consists of firm size, age, productivity, a dummy for SOE and a full set of firm, industry and time 
dummies. Further, I added a firm’s leverage34 as a proxy for access to finance, the wage bill as proxy for the 
skill level35, and an export and import dummy to capture the integration in international markets. These 
covariates are typical determinants for foreign acquisition (see for example Harris and Robinson, 2003; Girma 
et al, 2015). The marginal effects, reported in Table A 4 in the appendix, are similar for all four degrees of 
ownership. Consistently with a large body of empirical literature, I find that foreign investors prefer to acquire 
                                                 
33 The propensity scores are derived from a logit model in case 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 is the treatment variable. 
34 Measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
35 The wage bill is measured in logs relative to the size of the firm.  
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younger, larger, and more productive firms employing higher skilled employees that are more integrated into 
the global value chain. Further, foreign investors seem to be less likely to acquire state-owned or indebted 
firms. This “cherry picking” behavior is increasing in the ownership degree and is most pronounced for wholly 
acquired foreign firms.  
To ensure that the causal treatment effect can be identified, the overlap (or common support) condition is 
imposed, that is the probability of being acquired by a foreign firm with degree d conditional on Z is bounded 
between zero and one.36 A series of balancing tests confirms that the propensity score matching is successful 
in controlling for firm differences in the pre-treatment period.37  
In the next step, the potential outcome of each treatment, 𝑛𝑖𝑗?̂?, is predicted based on the estimates of (2). By 
setting 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑equal to one for all observations the potential net change in the product mix after foreign 
acquisition is obtained, by setting 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑 equal to zero the potential outcome of no foreign acquisition is 
obtained: 
𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
?̂? = Φ (β0̂ + 𝛽?̂?  + Γ̂(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1)) and 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
0̂ = Φ (β0̂ + Γ̂(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1)).  (4) 
In the final step of the doubly robust procedure, the ATE is calculated as the average difference between these 
two potential outcomes:  
𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑁𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
?̂? − 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
0̂ ) .     (5) 
Main results of the net effect of product switching 
Table 8 presents the result of the ATE estimation of the causal effects of foreign acquisition on net changes in 
the product scope. To account for potential time lags and ongoing restructuring processes of the production, I 
consider not only the year of acquisition, but also one, two and three years after acquisition. Already in the 
year of acquisition, foreign acquired firms have on average a 9.9 percent higher product scope than if they had 
stayed domestically owned.38 This effect is increasing in the post-acquisition phase.  
This net effect of product expansion is driven by firms which are majority or wholly foreign acquired. On 
average these firms add at least one product.39 After three years, majority owned firms produce on average 2.7 
products more than their domestic counterparts. The effect on net product expansion increases over post-
                                                 
36 Hence, the combination of observed covariates can also be found among domestic firms.   
37 Table A 6 in the appendix shows the balancing test for foreign ownership. Table A 7 in the appendix shows the balancing test 
separately for each ownership degree.  
38 Note that this effect is in line with the results of Table 3, column (1).  
39 The calculation is based on the average number of products of the domestic firms of the control group. The coefficient of majority 
ownership translates even to an increase in product scope by 1.55 products.  
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acquisition time.40 I assume that the increase in net product expansion is paired with stronger innovation 
activities of majority and wholly-acquired foreign firms.  The adaption of new production technologies might 
lead to faster internalization of higher synergy effects.  
Minority acquired foreign firms, in contrast, experience in the first years of acquisition a drop in the net 
extensive product margin. Firms seem to first rationalize their production process before adding new products 
to their product range. Foreign investors might induce firms to concentrate first on their core product in their 
core industries and churning products unrelated to their own interest. After two years of engaging in a joint 
venture with a foreign firm, they add new varieties to existing branches, expanding their product range on 
average by 0.8 products after three years.  
Small minority ownership has no statistically significant impact on the net changes in the product mix. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that these firms do not alter their product mix.41 
5.2.2. Product Adding and Dropping 
Since the net extensive product margin does not reveal product switching behavior, I look as well at the 
behavior of adding and dropping products following the acquisition by foreign investors.  
Empirical framework 
The decision to add or drop certain products is assumed to be a joint decision. Therefore, I model a confounders 
adjusted propensity-score reweighted bivariate Probit regression of the following form:  
𝑃𝑟(𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜏 =   1)  = Φ𝐴(β0
A + 𝛽𝑓
𝐴 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑 + Γ(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴 )  (6) 
𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜏 = 1)  = Φ𝐵(β0
D + 𝛽𝑓
𝐷 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑 + Γ(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1)  + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐷  )   (7) 
with  (𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴 , 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐷  ) ∼ [(
0
0
) , (
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
)]     (8) 
for all 𝑑 ∈ [1, … ,4], and error correlation parameter 𝜌. Add (Drop) is set equal to one if firm i changes its 
product mix by adding at least one product (suspending at least one product) between the pre-acquisition 
period t-1 and the post-acquisition period 𝑡 + 𝜏, and set to zero otherwise. 𝑋 is defined as before.  
To obtain the average treatment effects from the reweighted bivariate Probit estimates I follow Girma et al 
(2015). The propensity scores are obtained from the same logit and ordered logit model as before. The potential 
                                                 
40 Nevertheless, one has to be cautious: the difficulty of identifying the pure effect of foreign acquisition increases with the time 
after acquisition. 
41 As can be seen in the following section, small minority acquired firms have a higher probability to add and drop products following 
the years after foreign acquisition than their domestic counterparts (see Table 9). Thus, they might only change their product mix, 
but not expand their product scope.   
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probability of adding (dropping) a product under each treatment, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴?̂? (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐷?̂?), is calculated based on the 
bivariate probit model estimates by setting 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑  equal to one for all observations The same potential 
probability is predicted for the control group by setting 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑  equal to zero for all observations, that 
means the predicted probability of no foreign acquisition is estimated as 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴0̂ (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐷0̂).42Thus,  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴?̂? = Φ𝐴 (β0
Â + 𝛽𝑓
?̂? 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑑 + Γ̂(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1)) and 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴0̂ = Φ𝐴 (β0
Â + Γ̂(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1)) . (9) 
With the help of these, the average treatment effect of foreign acquisition on the probability to changes in the 
product mix is calculated by  
𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑁𝑖=1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴?̂? − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴0̂)  .    (10) 
 Main results of product adding and dropping 
Panel A of Table 9 shows the effect of receiving foreign capital on product adding, while panel B of Table 9 
shows the effects on product churning. To achieve a leaner production range and to internalize higher synergy 
effects, acquired firms drastically change their product mix by adding new products and dropping others.43 On 
average recently acquired foreign firms are 10.2 percent more likely to add products than their domestic 
counterparts. Foreign owned firms are more active in changing their product mix than comparable firms in 
domestic hands. Within the first three years of acquisition foreign firms drop at least one product with a 
likelihood of 22.8 percent compared to their domestic counterparts. However, they add at least one product 
with a likelihood of 36.9 percent increasing in total their net extensive product margin as shown before. 
In correspondence with Table 8, the results in Table 9 are driven by majority and wholly acquired foreign 
firms. The probability of a being innovative and adding new products to the product portfolio increases with 
the degree of foreign ownership and the length of the post-acquisition phase. Partly, this reflects a higher 
product innovation activity of foreign owned firms. Foreign owned firms are also more likely to drop products, 
potentially induced by the cannibalization effect. By introducing new products to their existing product lines 
they might encounter sales reduction in their own existing products. Hence, majority and wholly acquired 
firms not only restructure the production process, they potentially drop internationally non-competitive and 
unrelated product lines from their product portfolio. These changes in the product mix might reflect a different 
market orientation of foreign investors compared to their domestic counterparts. Foreign acquired firms export 
more and are more integrated in the international market. Stronger international competition and international 
                                                 
42 The estimation steps are equal if 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the treatment variable. Equation (7) and (8) are analogues for product dropping.  
43 Though, the more similar products are within the product portfolio, the stronger is the cannibalization effect of the marginal 
variety. However, foreign firms seem to be able to be less prone to this cannibalization effect. Due to their multinational activities, 
they are able to differentiate their products across locations and quality such that they mitigate the cannibalization effect. 
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brand recognition of the respective products might force multinational companies to invest more in product 
innovation. Exporting via the foreign parent is associated with a higher product scope (see section 4.1) and, as 
Girma et al (2015), Guadalupe et al (2012), Lileeva and Trefler (2010) show, associated with higher innovation 
activities.  
Minority acquired firms have a higher probability to drop products than adding products in the first three years 
after foreign acquisition. This is in line with the previous result that minority owned firms have in the first 
years after acquisition a negative impact on the net extensive product margin. Due to reduced ownership rights 
restructuring processes in management and manufacturing might take more time to be effective. Churning 
products to enhance productivity and competitiveness of the acquired partner could be one of their first action, 
while simultaneously engaging in product and process innovation.  
The ATE of product adding and dropping is relatively small for small minority owned firms. Compared to 
similar domestic firms, small minority owned firms change their product mix only with a probability of around 
5 percent within the first years. Lower control and voting rights and potentially lower technological transfers 
seem to reduce the impact of foreign investors on the product mix. Hence, the potential benefits on productivity 
through changes in the product mix might be smaller for firms with a lower foreign ownership degree.  
5.3. Innovation 
Since introducing a new product is associated with higher innovation activity, I also look explicitly at 
innovation activities and upgrading activities as sensitivity and robustness check.44 Introducing new products 
usually assumes some degree of innovation activity, in particular related to product innovation.  
Innovation is measured by the reported Research and Development expenditures. Innovation is set equal to 
one if there is an increase in the innovation activity between period t and t+1. Table 10, panel A, shows the 
ATE of the probability of engaging in innovation after receiving foreign capital.45 As expected, foreign 
ownership is associated with a higher innovation activity. The probability of innovating increases over time. 
Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish whether the reported innovation expenditures are related to process or 
product innovation activities. Process innovation could increase the flexibility of the manufacturing process, 
                                                 
44 Analyzing the effects of foreign ownership on upgrading activities related to cost reduction to separate product and process 
innovation is beyond the scope of this paper. It is a research question on its own to analyze the effect of investment liberalization on 
marginal costs, prices and mark-ups. See De Loecker et al (2016) for an analysis of the effect of a tariff reduction on marginal costs, 
prices and mark-ups of MPFs.  
45 I estimate the ATE again with a doubly robust estimator. The potential probabilities of engaging in innovation are based on the 
estimates of the inverse propensity score reweighted Probit model: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼?̂? = Φ𝐴 (β0
?̂? + 𝛽𝑓
?̂?  𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + Γ̂(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1))  and 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐼0̂ = Φ𝐴 (β0
Î + Γ̂(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1)) . 
The vector X includes the same variables as before, except the squared productivity term.  
CHAPTER 7. PRODUCT MIX AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
35
  
22 
lower marginal cost and increase the economies of scale. Product innovation is more related to a firm’s effort 
to create new products or to upgrade products such that they are considered as new product.46 
In the following, I use the available unit values of products to proxy quality. I assume that a firm engages in 
product upgrading (or process innovation) if the price of existing, not churned products increases in the post-
acquisition period. To account for changes in the product mix, I include the importance of a specific product 
for the firm, measured by the share of the product in the firm’s total sales and the value of the firm sales of the 
product, as additional control variable. Table 10, panel B, shows the ATE of the probability of engaging in 
product upgrading. Foreign owned firms increase the quality of their products already in the year of 
acquisition. Due to access to new technologies and skills, foreign owned firms are 43.4 percent more likely to 
engage in product upgrading activities than if they had stayed in domestic hands. If an acquired firm keeps a 
product in its product portfolio, it improves its quality with a probability of around 50 percent in the years 
after acquisition compared to their domestic counterparts with similar products. 
6. Outlook and conclusion 
The introduction of new products plays an important role in international trade and economic growth. Various 
empirical and theoretical work has uncovered how trade liberalization and export behavior affects the product 
mix. Goldberg et al (2010) estimated substantial gains from the Indian trade liberalization in 1991 through 
access to new imported inputs. Simultaneously to the trade liberalization, India opened its markets for FDI.  
In this paper, I use a unique firm-product-level dataset of Indian manufacturing firms to shed lights on the 
impact of FDI on the product mix. My result suggest that FDI inflows into India following the investment 
liberalization period have drastically restructured the within firm resource allocation and production processes. 
Foreign acquired firms have become leaner in their production structure while expanding their product scope. 
Being more active in product and process innovation than their domestic counterparts, foreign owned firms 
produce on average approximately one product more than if they had stayed in domestic hands. Further, with 
a probability of around 50 percent foreign owned firms upgrade existing products after acquisition. The higher 
the foreign control, the higher are potentially technological spillovers and the larger is the impact on the 
product mix. Majority acquired foreign firms are particularly active in changing their product mix. They 
expand their products scope by around 2.7 products within three years of foreign acquisition.  
Compared to purely domestic firms, foreign owned firms use a more flexible manufacturing technology 
allowing them to produce more related goods together. Thus, foreign owned firms are able to realize higher 
synergy effects than if they stayed in domestic hands. Their cross-border activities might mitigate a potential 
                                                 
46 Product innovation activities might also increase the quality of a product, though product innovation is more related to the 
introduction of new products then upgrading existing products (see Dhingra, 2013).   
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cannibalization effect since foreign owned firms can diversify their products more across qualities and 
locations.  
I show that FDI inflows induce higher product-level dynamics which are an important driver of productivity 
growth. Adopting new technologies and realizing synergy effects allows cost reduction and innovation. By 
analyzing product-level dynamics within firms, my paper reveals an important micro-level channel of 
productivity increases after foreign acquisitions. Access to developed countries’ technologies and know-how 
through FDI affects firm performance by product scope expansion of acquired companies.47 
The introduction of new products is suggestive that India’s trade and investment reform let to dynamic 
economic and welfare gains as these new and upgraded products fed into the domestic economy. Innovation 
and productivity improvements within firms account for a large fraction of productivity gains. As Hausman et 
al (2007) argue, the mix of goods that a country produces has important implications for economic growth. 
The FDI-induced product scope expansion and the increase of different varieties has potentially contributed 
to India’s economic growth and its welfare gains in the last decades.  
However, my analysis neglects possible spillover effects and potential repercussions on local firms. On one 
hand possible technological spillovers and increased competition in product brands might spur product 
innovation among domestic firms. On the other hand, the introduction of new, higher quality varieties by 
foreign owned firms might crowed out domestic varieties; local firms might not be competitive enough to 
manufacture the respective variety, and eventually exit the market. The overall effect of FDI on product 
differentiation and the product mix of a country is subject to more research.   
My analysis focuses only of the restructuring process of firms acquired by foreign owners in the host country 
India, neglecting further possible restructuring processes in the home country. The interplay between the 
changes of the product mix and the product scope of the acquired firm in developing countries and possible 
changes in the product composition at home clearly deserve more research48.   
 
  
                                                 
47 Additional research requires a more detailed look on how mark-ups and marginal costs of each product changes after foreign 
acquisition. De Loecker et al (2016) recently developed a method to disentangle prices, mark-ups and marginal costs for each product 
of MPFs.  
48 The drain of organizational capital might for example drop the marginal products from production at home, thus, reducing the 
product scope at home. 
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Figure 1: Average number of products per firm over time 
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Table 1: Prevalence of multi-product firms in India 
 Share of 
firms 
Share of 
output 
Mean Products, 
industries or sectors per firm 
 
domestic    
Multi-product 0.44 0.78 4.07 
Multi-industry 0.44 0.77 3.94 
Multi-sector 0.43 0.76 2.90 
    
foreign    
Multi-product 0.64 0.93 5.64 
Multi-industry 0.61 0.82 4.62 
Multi-sector 0.50 0.82 2.60 
 
Note: The table categorizes firms according to whether they produce multiple products (at the five-digit product categories), 
industries (four-digit NIC categories), or sectors (two-digit NIC categories).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Product switching activities by Indian manufacturing firms 
  Annual Average  Five-years Average  
 Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
     
No activity 70.0% 60.1% 56.6% 24.4% 
Drop product(s) only 12.9% 16.3% 24.7% 20.5% 
Add product(s) only 9.6% 12.7% 7.4% 3.7 % 
Both add and drop 7.4% 10.9% 11.3% 51.4% 
 
Note: Table classifies continuing firm activity into four mutually exclusive groups: no activity, add only, drop only, and both. A 
product addition is defined as a firm adding a product in period t that it did not produce in the previous period. A drop is defined as 
a firm’s dropping a product in period t that it produced in the previous time period.   
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Table 3: Product scope and foreign ownership 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm, industry and year fixed effects included in all 
regressions. Productivity measured by TFP. The difference in the number of observation between the first three columns can be 
attributed to missing values in the TFP estimation. Replicating column (1) with the sample of column (2) or (3) yields a coefficient 
of similar significance and magnitude for foreign ownership.   
 
 
  
   Total sample (1989-2013)  1989-2003  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Foreign 0.0865*** 0.0458* 0.0472** 0.0449* 
  (0.0251) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0253) 
Productivity   0.0155** 0.0180* 0.0425*** 
    (0.0061) (0.0094) (0.0090) 
Productivity2     -0.0058*** -0.0036** 
      (0.0015) (0.0017) 
Age   0.0032 0.0033 0.0301*** 
    (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0041) 
Size   0.0453*** 0.0440*** 0.0015 
    (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0081) 
SOE   0.1554*** 0.1555*** 0.1901*** 
    (0.0573) (0.0581) (0.0704) 
Constant 0.9241*** 0.7976*** 0.7581*** 0.7741*** 
  (0.0535) (0.1749) (0.1753) (0.1990) 
         
Observations 78,575 52,116 52,116 19,867 
R-squared 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.1361 
Number of firms 9,422 7,810 7,810 5,100 
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Table 4: Product scope, foreign ownership and the position in the global value chain 
   All Goods   Intermediates  Final Goods  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Foreign 0.0467** 0.0464** 0.0479** 0.0128 
  (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0207) (0.0287) 
Productivity 0.0180* 0.0181* 0.0292*** 0.0056 
  (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0078) (0.0073) 
Productivity^2 -0.0052*** -0.0053*** -0.0047*** -0.0021* 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
Age 0.0369*** 0.0369*** 0.0210*** 0.0196*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0046) 
Size 0.0027 0.0027 0.0094* -0.0081 
  (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0056) 
SOE 0.1554** 0.1576*** 0.1312* -0.0233 
  (0.0613) (0.0598) (0.0788) (0.0573) 
Imports 0.0443*** 0.0472*** 0.0469*** 0.0409** 
  (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0187) 
Imports*Foreign  -0.0351   
   (0.0379)   
Exports 0.1033*** 0.1023*** 0.0639*** 0.0567*** 
  (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0170) 
Exports*Foreign  0.0108***   
   (0.0037)   
Constant 0.7557*** 0.7546*** 0.7270*** 0.7239*** 
  (0.1746) (0.1746) (0.1677) (0.1962) 
      
Observations 52,116 52,116 39,395 18,833 
R-squared 0.120 0.120 0.191 0.261 
Number of firms 7,810 7,810 6,222 3,081 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm, industry and year fixed effects included in all 
regressions. Productivity measured by TFP.  
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Table 5: Sensitivity and robustness test 
  
Labor productivity  Number of products 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Foreign 0.0397*** 0.0404*** 0.0715*** 0.0849*** 0.0717* 
  (0.0129) (0.0149) (0.0099) (0.0265) (0.0433) 
Productivity 0.0137*** 0.0272*** -0.0122 -0.0156 0.0353*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0124) (0.0146) (0.0127) 
Productivity2 -0.0014*** -0.0015*** -0.0040*** -0.0034 -0.0013*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0005) 
Age 0.0026 0.0031 0.1368*** 0.0038*** 0.1138*** 
  (0.0041) (0.0086) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0059) 
Size 0.0153*** 0.0731*** 0.0039*** 0.1266*** 0.0051*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0002) (0.0048) (0.0005) 
SOE 0.0758 0.0777*** 0.2354*** 0.2808 0.1010 
  (0.2072) (0.0114) (0.0627) (0.2171) (0.1535) 
Imports   0.0488***     0.0968*** 
    (0.0122)     (0.0199) 
Imports*Foreign   0.0698*     0.0492** 
    (0.0382)     (0.0199) 
Exports   0.0660***     0.0897* 
    (0.0125)     (0.0507) 
Exports*Foreign   -0.0320     0.0141 
    (0.0403)     (0.0501) 
Constant 0.4534*** 0.8230*** 0.3283*** 0.4202*** 0.4023* 
  (0.1291) (0.1990) (0.0307) (0.0489) (0.2298) 
            
Observations 48,718 40,816 53,557 53,557 41,846 
R-squared 0.115 0.189 0.061 0.083 0.091 
Number of firms 7,534 6,447       
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm, industry and year fixed effects included in all 
regressions. Productivity is measured by labor productivity in column (1) and (2) and by TFP in column (3) to (5). In column (3) to 
(5), the number of products is the dependent variable. Column (3) estimates a Poisson model, while column (4) and (5) are estimated 
using a Negative Binominal model. The Poisson model in column (3) corrects for overdispersion by rescaling the standard errors 
according to Pearson X2-based dispersion. The coefficients of the count data models are shown. The R-squared of the count data 
models correspond to McFadden's adjusted Pseudo-R-squared.  
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Table 6: Product skewness and foreign ownership 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm, industry and year fixed effects included in all 
regressions. Productivity is measured by TFP. The HHI index is normalized and constrained between 0 and 1. 
 
  
No of varieties 
within product lines 
 No of industries  
No of  
sectors 
 HHI  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Foreign 0.0385** 0.0048 -0.0371** -0.0197* 
  (0.0167) (0.0190) (0.0182) (0.0112) 
Productivity 0.0087 -0.0653*** -0.0586*** -0.0237*** 
  (0.0071) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0068) 
Productivity2 -0.0002 0.0028*** 0.0026*** 0.0001 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Age -0.0038 0.0090* 0.0076 0.0053* 
  (0.0034) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0030) 
Size 0.0184*** 0.0685*** 0.0619*** 0.0338*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0030) 
SOE -0.1006* 0.0984 0.1346 0.0482 
  (0.0562) (0.1170) (0.1363) (0.1241) 
Constant 0.3257*** 0.1919 0.1702 0.3121*** 
  (0.1073) (0.1574) (0.1494) (0.0937) 
          
Observations 56,995 54,963 54,963 54,963 
R-squared 0.00126 0.143 0.132 0.0547 
Number of firms 8,068 8,046 8,046 8,046 
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Table 8: Foreign ownership types and the development of the Average Treatment Effect of the change in the 
product mix up to three years after foreign acquisition 
 Time after acquisition t t+1 t+2 t+3 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
          
Foreign ownership       
Foreign 0.0993*** 0.110*** 0.103*** 0.211*** 
  (0.00266) (0.00199) (0.00225) (0.00278) 
Observations 33,693 33,693 33,693 33,693 
          
Foreign ownership type       
Small minority 0.0771 0.0764 0.0473 0.111 
  (0.0668) (0.0873) (0.0901) (0.172) 
Observation 30,542 30,542 30,542 30,542 
          
Minority -0.172** -0.131** 0.125** 0.186*** 
  (0.0719) (0.0610) (0.0619) (0.0613) 
Observation 24,220 24,220 24,220 24,220 
          
Majority 0.372*** 0.472*** 0.582*** 0.604*** 
  (0.0677) (0.0694) (0.0759) (0.0713) 
Observation 28,806 28,806 28,806 28,806 
          
Full ownership 0.223*** 0.598*** 0.625*** 0.330*** 
  (0.0741) (0.163) (0.221) (0.0504) 
Observations 28,977 28,977 28,977 28,977 
 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ATE of receiving foreign capital on the (log) 
number of products is derived from the doubly robust estimator as described in the text. The control group is being domestically 
owned. Industry and year fixed effects included.  
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Table 9: Average Treatment Effect of product switching after foreign acquisition 
  t Within the first 3 years Within the first five years 
Panel A: Add       
Foreign 0.102*** 0.369*** 0.471*** 
  (0.00985) (0.00385) (0.00413) 
Observations 31,072 31,072 31,072 
     
Foreign ownership type   
Small minority 0.0165 0.0491*** 0.199*** 
  (0.0568) (0.00748) (0.0529) 
Observation 29,394 29,394 29,394 
     
Minority 0.0976*** 0.116** 0.380*** 
  (0.00885) (0.0533) (0.0694) 
Observation 30,425 30,895 30,895 
     
Majority 0.114** 0.448*** 0.528*** 
  (0.0533) (0.0381) (0.0647) 
Observation 30,425 30,425 30,425 
     
Wholly acquired 0.132*** 0.578*** 0.618*** 
  (0.0180) (0.00421) (0.0531) 
Observation 30,241 30,241 30,241 
     
     
Panel B: Drop   
Foreign 0.0377 0.228*** 0.397*** 
  (0.0695) (0.0037) (0.0423) 
Observations 31,072 31,072 31,072 
     
Foreign ownership type   
Small minority 0.0255 0.0533** 0.361*** 
  (0.0547) (0.0276) (0.0454) 
Observation 29,394 29,394 29,394 
     
Minority 0.205*** 0.331*** 0.365*** 
  (0.0301) (0.0866) (0.0469) 
Observation 30,895 30,895 30,895 
     
Majority 0.0289*** 0.237*** 0.386*** 
  (0.00662) (0.0510) (0.0648) 
Observation 30,425 30,425 30,425 
     
Wholly acquired 0.0497*** 0.214*** 0.425*** 
  (0.0148) (0.0578) (0.0534) 
Observations 30,241 30,241 30,241 
 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ATE of receiving foreign capital on the product 
adding and dropping is derived from the doubly robust estimator as described in the text. The control group is being domestically 
owned. Industry and year fixed effects included.  
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Table 10: Average Treatment Effect of product upgrading after foreign acquisition 
 Time after acquisition t t+1 t+2 t+3 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
          
Panel A: Innovation         
Foreign 0.0690*** 0.0816*** 0.101*** 0.116*** 
  (0.000185) (0.000128) (0.000154) (0.000309) 
Observations 32,772 32,772 32,772 32,772 
          
Panel B: Product upgrading       
Foreign 0.434*** 0.503*** 0.560*** 0.495*** 
  (0.0810) (0.0784) (0.0795) (0.0975) 
Observations 77,115 73,638 70,638 68,127 
 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ATE of receiving foreign capital on innovation 
is estimated at the firm level while ATE on product upgrading is derived at the product level using the doubly robust estimator as 
described in the text. The control group is being domestically owned. Industry and year fixed effects included.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Examples of industries, sectors and products 
NIC   Description 
22 Sector Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  
2211 Industry Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes, retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyre  
 11031001000000 
P
ro
d
u
ct
s Rubber tyres and tubes for motor vehicles, motorcycles, scooters 
 11031001020000 Bus and lorry tyres 
 11031001030000 
 
Aero tyres 
 11031001040101 Scooter 2 wheeler tyres 
 11031001040102 Scooter 3 wheeler tyres 
 11031001050000 Cycle tyres 
 …   
2219 Industry Manufacture of other rubber products 
 11030801000000 
P
ro
d
u
ct
s 
Hoses, tubes and pipes of vulcanised rubber 
 11030801010000 Vacuum brake hoses 
 11030801050000 Fire fighting hose 
 11031401000000 Rubber gloves 
 11031402000000 Rubber aprons 
 11039901000000 Rubber balloons 
 …   
2220 Industry Manufacture of plastic products 
 11020903020000 
P
ro
d
u
ct
s 
Synthetic leather baggage 
 14160199060000 Cassettes 
 14160199060100 Audio cassettes 
 14160199060700 Compact Discs 
 …  
    
 
Note: Only a subset of the available products are listed for the respective industries in the manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products sector. For NIC 2211 there are a total of 37 products, for NIC 2219 there are a total of 60 products and for NIC 2220 
there are a total of 82 products. The five-digit product classification comprises the first ten numbers of the product code.  
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Total Factor Productivity 
To estimate the production function, firm level labor, capital and materials are needed. Since Prowess does 
not have reliable employment information, I use the total wage bill1 as measure for labor. Material inputs 
are measured by the firm wide consumption of commodities in the process of manufacturing or 
transformation into products. Capital is measured by the gross fixed assets2, which includes movable and 
immovable assets. For the estimation, all relevant values are deflated using all-India wholesale sector-
specific price indices provided by the Office of the Economic Adviser of the Indian Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry3.  
TFP is constructed following the methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)4. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the estimated equation for company i in industry j at time t is  
yijt = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑡  ,  (11) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 refers to firm i’s output at time t, k is the capital stock, l is labor and m are intermediate inputs 
and e is energy used. All variables are expressed in natural logarithm. 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the respective time-varying 
productivity shock of firm i and 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the measurement error in output, uncorrelated with input choices. 
According to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), if the demand function for intermediate inputs is monotonic in 
the firm’s productivity for all given levels of capital, 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡), raw materials can serve as a 
valid proxy for unobserved productivity shocks and consistent estimates of the parameters of the production 
function can be obtained. In a first estimation stage, the intermediate input demand function is inverted and 
substituted in equation (11), such that the coefficients of l and e can be obtained by using semi-parametric 
methods. 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑚 are obtained in a second stage by GMM estimation techniques assuming that capital 
adjusts slowly and productivity follows a Markov process.5 To account for industry specific effects, 
parameters of the production function are obtained for each industry j. A Hicks-neutral TFP is then obtained 
by subtracting the predicted output of firm i from its actual output at time t. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The total wage bill includes bonuses as well as contributions to employees’ provident funds.  
2 Gross fixed assets constructed by the perpetual inventory method rather than net fixed assets are used since no detailed 
information on the economic rate of depreciation are available for the Indian manufacturing industry.  
3 Retrieved from http://www.eaindustry.nic.in/home.asp (03/01/2016).  
4 The choice of the methodology to derive TFP does not affect the results of this paper. The results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar using fixed effects, or estimating (2) without energy as additional intermediate to obtain TFP. All TFP 
measures are highly correlated (see also Van Beveren, 2010). 
5 Please see Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for more details. Since no firm-specific deflators are available, the productivity measure 
is likely to include as well technical efficiency and price-cost markups (Katayama et al, 2009).  
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Table A 2: Summary statistic 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Foreign 108754 0.100971 0.3012917 0 1 
Productivity 60160 3.98614 0.623967 -3.593524 11.88802 
Productivity2  60160 16.27864 5.494841 0.0000878 141.325 
Output (Size) 60160 32.25154 368.0753 0.0001569 35957 
Raw Materials 60160 17.75768 246.9611 0.0001744 23836.52 
Wage 60160 1.289278 8.289216 0.000091 487.0954 
Capital 60060 16.70906 229.8519 0 22735.71 
Age 59824 22.56653 17.79665 1 150 
SOE 60160 0.11137 0.0333538 0 1 
Export Dummy 60160 0.5239029 0.4994325 0 1 
Import Dummy 60160 0.485256 0.4997867 0 1 
Number of Products 57590 4.430666 4.018674 1 131 
Number of Industries 57590 3.039392 2.484343 1 39 
Number of Sectors 57590 2.179379 1.433255 1 14 
HHI  60160 0.6178336 0.4054427 0 1 
Number of Final Goods 20806 2.561953 2.916392 1 66 
Number of Intermediate Goods 43994 2.878597 2.711868 1 110 
Research and Development Expenditures 33926 0.7745174 5.567138 0 228.5958 
Product Unit Values 251333 0.3902446 14.6342 2.14e-10 1774.012 
 
Note: Productivity is measured as log TFP. Output, raw materials, wage, capital, research and development expenditures, and 
the unit values of the manufacturing products are measured in thousand US Dollar.   
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Table A 3: Foreign direct investment in India’s manufacturing sector after India’s investment liberalization 
Year 
 
No. of foreign 
acquisitions 
Percent of 
foreign firms 
Foreign direct investment, 
net inflows (% of GDP) 
1993 20 1.85 0.19 
1994 13 2.40 0.29 
1995 27 2.69 0.58 
1996 18 2.94 0.61 
1997 20 3.44 0.85 
1998 39 4.53 0.61 
1999 201 5.51 0.46 
2000 316 8.23 0.75 
2001 102 8.69 1.11 
2002 127 8.91 1.07 
2003 111 8.85 0.70 
2004 94 8.85 0.80 
2005 105 9.05 0.87 
2006 183 9.52 2.11 
2007 104 9.46 2.04 
2008 57 9.42 3.55 
2009 51 9.57 2.61 
2010 76 9.80 1.60 
2011 58 10.06 1.99 
2012 185 11.24 1.31 
2013 155 13.25 1.51 
 
Note: The number of foreign acquisition and the percent of foreign firms is calculated based on the Prowess database. The net 
inflow of foreign direct investments as a share of GDP is obtained from the World Development Indicates of the World Bank.  
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Co-production 
To highlight possible co-production of products firms tend to produce together, Table 7 follows Bernard et 
al (2010) and reports the average annual frequency (in hundreds) with which firms co-produce products 
within and across sectors. Firms with more than two products may be counted more than once in each cell.  
Like Bernard et al (2010) I assume that the expected frequency of coproduction follow an independent 
Poisson distribution. The observed co-production frequencies, 𝑜𝑟𝑐, in row r and column c are compared to 
those that would be expected according to a null hypothesis that the decision to produce a certain product 
is independent from another. The expected frequencies of co-production, 𝑒𝑟𝑐, is calculated under the null 
hypothesis as the total observed co-production multiplied with the total frequency of co-production in all 
row industries and the total frequency of all column industries. The statistic for testing whether the entire 
coproduction matrix is generated by random coproduction, 
∑ (𝑜𝑟𝑐 − 𝑒𝑟𝑐)
2/𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑟,𝑐        (12) 
with 𝑜𝑟𝑐 and 𝑒𝑟𝑐 being the observed and expected frequencies in row r and column c, respectively, is chi-
squared distributed. The null hypothesis that a firm produces a certain product independently of other 
products is rejected (p-value<0.01). 
Products with dark blue and dark orange shading are significantly more often produced together than 
expected assuming that product lines are independent from each other.  Dark and light blue shading indicate 
statistically significantly higher and lower co-production at the 1 percent level, respectively, than is implied 
by a null hypothesis of random co-production. The absence of shading indicates the absence of statistically 
significant differences from this null hypothesis. Dark orange and light orange shading indicate further 
statistical significantly higher and lower co-production at the 1 percent level of foreign firms compared to 
domestic firms. Thus, the orange shading on top of the blue indicates whether the non-random co-
production behavior is statistically more or less pronounced by foreign owned firms. This is tested by a 
simple t-test comparing the relative frequency of observed co-production within and across industry for 
domestic and foreign firms. 
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Table A 4: Determinants of foreign acquisition: Average marginal effects obtained from the logit model 
and the ordered logit model  
  Foreign  Foreign acquisition structure  
  Small minority Minority  Majority Full Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Productivity 0.00902*** 0.00241*** 0.00245*** 0.00351*** 0.00714*** 
  (0.00168) (0.000336) (0.000346) (0.000472) (0.000931) 
Age -0.00868*** -0.00192*** -0.00195*** -0.00279*** -0.00568*** 
  (0.000809) (0.000206) (0.000209) (0.000271) (0.000536) 
Size 0.00395*** 0.000731*** 0.000745*** 0.00107*** 0.00217*** 
  (0.000498) (0.000108) (0.000109) (0.000155) (0.000298) 
Leverage -0.000444 -0.000225 -0.000735 -0.000968 -0.00155 
  (0.000422) (0.000741) (0.00242) (0.00318) (0.00509) 
Wage 0.00985*** 0.00242*** 0.00247*** 0.00353*** 0.00719*** 
  (0.000980) (0.000243) (0.000248) (0.000315) (0.000595) 
SOE 0.0419*** 0.00870*** 0.00886*** 0.0127*** 0.0258*** 
  (0.0127) (0.00232) (0.00235) (0.00335) (0.00660) 
Exports 0.00350** 0.000995*** 0.00101*** 0.00145*** 0.00295*** 
  (0.00162) (0.000354) (0.000364) (0.000512) (0.00103) 
Imports 0.00476*** 0.00131*** 0.00134*** 0.00191*** 0.00390*** 
  (0.00168) (0.000368) (0.000374) (0.000532) (0.00108) 
       
Observations 40,738 33,235 33,235 33,235 33,235 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) shows the average marginal effects 
obtained from the logit model, column (2) to (5) show the average marginal effects obtained from the ordered logit model. 
Margins are calculated at means. Industry and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Productivity is measured by TFP.  
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Table A 5: Summary statistic of pre-acquisition characteristics  
  Productivity Age Size Leverage Wage SOE Exports Imports 
Non-acquired Firms        
Mean 3.970 24.017 8.617 3.083 5.617 0.051 0.615 0.571 
Std. deviation 0.642 18.846 1.921 20.445 1.741 0.023 0.487 0.495 
Observation 33377 33377 33377 33377 33377 33377 33377 33377 
          
Acquired Firms        
Mean 3.975 23.929 9.633 2.528 6.674 0.001 0.851 0.805 
Std. deviation 0.513 19.456 1.859 5.716 1.699 0.011 0.356 0.396 
Observation 3167 3167 3167 3167 3167 3167 3167 3167 
          
Overall         
Mean 3.970 24.010 8.705 3.035 5.708 0.047 0.635 0.591 
Std. deviation 0.632 18.899 1.937 19.612 1.762 0.022 0.481 0.492 
Observation 36544 36544 36544 36544 36544 36544 36544 36544 
 
Note: This summary statistic compares the characteristics of non-acquired firms with the pre-acquisition characteristics of foreign 
acquired firms. Since foreign acquired firms differ in their characteristics from non-acquired firms it is necessary to take the 
selection decision of foreign investors into account. 
 
Table A 6: Balancing tests for differences in observed pre-treatment characteristics for foreign ownership 
Propensity Score Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Productivity 0.057 0.089 0.063 0.001 -0.064 
 (0.093) (0.066) (0.254) (0.014) (0.110) 
Age 2.355 1.688 6.258 -0.429 -1.473 
 (1.652) (1.260) (0.875) (0.564) (0.988) 
Size 0.151 0.504 0.025 -0.237 -0.383 
 (0.206) (0.109) (0.074) (0.463) (0.370) 
Leverage 2.299 0.083 -0.149 0.238 -0.153 
 (3.988) (0.375) (0.226) (0.193) (0.177) 
Wage 0.115 0.402 0.033 -0.276 -0.331 
 (0.146) (0.860) (0.059) (0.237) (0.231) 
SOE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) 
Export  -0.034 -0.021 -0.005 0.001 -0.015 
 (0.042) (0.032) (0.020) (0.011) (0.025) 
Import  -0.014 0.001 -0.026 -0.012 0.003 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.021) (0.010) (0.004) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To ensure that the propensity score is successful in 
controlling for firm differences in the pre-acquisition period, for each control group and acquired firms pairing, the sample is 
divided by propensity score quintiles, and for each subsample the equality in means of the pre-treatment covariates between 
acquired and non-acquired firms is tested.  
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Table A 7: Balancing tests for differences in observed pre-treatment characteristics for different foreign 
ownership degrees 
Panel A: Domestic versus small minority acquisition firms  
Propensity Score Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Productivity -0.161 0.134 -0.061 -0.147 -0.078 
 (0.353) (0.162) (0.126) (0.169) (0.142) 
Age 3.125 -6.161 -5.484 -1.435 -0.180 
 (9.124) (4.762) (4.525) (2.750) (1.763) 
Size 0.761 0.866 -0.801 -0.707 -0.658 
 (0.838) (0.412) (0.386) (0.448) (0.376) 
Leverage 1.090 0.077 0.733 -0.023 0.066 
 (3.730) (1.345) (1.241) (0.549) (0.248) 
Wage 0.635 0.328 -0.470 -0.326 -0.447 
 (0.700) (0.356) (0.340) (0.226) (0.369) 
SOE 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Export  0.125 -0.002 -0.029 -0.053 -0.051 
 (0.210) (0.125) (0.103) (0.049) (0.032) 
Import  0.320 0.073 -0.050 -0.054 -0.071 
 (0.209) (0.124) (0.115) (0.058) (0.136) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To ensure that the propensity score is successful in 
controlling for firm differences in the pre-acquisition period, for each control group and small minority acquired firms pairing, 
the sample is divided by propensity score quintiles, and for each subsample the equality in means of the pre-treatment covariates 
between acquired and non-acquired firms is tested. 
 
 
Panel B: Domestic versus minority acquisition firms  
Propensity Score Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Productivity -0.175 -0.259 0.041 -0.049 0.095 
 (0.386) (0.350) (0.129) (0.118) (0.470) 
Age -9.499 -9.496 0.948 -0.136 0.540 
 (9.875) (10.877) (4.627) (4.780) (1.980) 
Size -0.002 -1.454 0.452 -0.409 0.296 
 (0.912) (0.933) (0.396) (0.429) (0.199) 
Leverage 1.113 0.263 -1.913 0.409 0.215 
 (3.154) (3.193) (1.154) (0.957) (0.573) 
Wage 0.410 -0.583 0.355 -0.498 0.090 
 (0.765) (0.810) (0.349) (0.394) (0.191) 
SOE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Export  -0.164 -0.117 0.074 -0.024 0.003 
 (0.236) (0.287) (0.102) (0.084) (0.036) 
Import  0.331 0.154 -0.073 0.003 -0.026 
 (0.235) (0.289) (0.115) (0.099) (0.040) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To ensure that the propensity score is successful in 
controlling for firm differences in the pre-acquisition period, for each control group and minority acquired firms pairing, the 
sample is divided by propensity score quintiles, and for each subsample the equality in means of the pre-treatment covariates 
between acquired and non-acquired firms is tested. 
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Panel C: Domestic versus majority acquisition firms  
Propensity Score Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Productivity -0.342 -0.328 -0.161 0.040 0.037 
 (0.451) (0.361) (0.251) (0.143) (0.051) 
Age 11.950 14.310 9.116 -4.878 2.456 
 (11.635) (10.861) (9.050) (5.708) (2.106) 
Size -1.269 1.068 -0.562 -0.076 0.183 
 (1.064) (0.944) (0.769) (0.514) (0.212) 
Leverage -3.462 1.047 1.182 -0.494 0.249 
 (4.453) (2.979) (2.426) (1.155) (0.292) 
Wage -0.065 0.968 -0.512 -0.087 0.025 
 (0.892) (0.818) (0.678) (0.469) (0.203) 
SOE 0.001 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Export  -0.005 -0.384 -0.207 0.008 0.019 
 (0.271) (0.289) (0.202) (0.102) (0.039) 
Import  0.322 0.128 -0.287 -0.042 -0.012 
 (0.270) (0.288) (0.226) (0.120) (0.043) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To ensure that the propensity score is successful in 
controlling for firm differences in the pre-acquisition period, for each control group and majority acquired firms pairing, the 
sample is divided by propensity score quintiles, and for each subsample the equality in means of the pre-treatment covariates 
between acquired and non-acquired firms is tested. 
 
Panel D: Domestic versus wholly-acquired firms  
Propensity Score Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Productivity 0.159 0.575 -0.158 0.108 0.010 
 (0.587) (0.370) (0.243) (0.249) (0.100) 
Age 5.986 4.443 9.919 7.065 2.626 
 (14.825) (11.056) (8.789) (9.901) (4.213) 
Size -0.229 0.557 0.405 0.830 1.065 
 (1.373) (0.962) (0.782) (0.890) (0.819) 
Leverage 1.461 1.436 -0.371 -0.871 0.621 
 (6.829) (3.043) (2.179) (1.957) (0.593) 
Wage -0.976 -0.928 1.123 0.776 0.834 
 (1.119) (0.833) (4.278) (0.808) (0.801) 
SOE 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Export  -0.480 -0.535 0.078 -0.107 -0.045 
 (0.330) (0.488) (0.189) (0.179) (0.077) 
Import  -0.691 -0.239 -0.242 -0.160 0.112 
 (0.327) (0.286) (0.214) (0.211) (0.086) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To ensure that the propensity score is successful in 
controlling for firm differences in the pre-acquisition period, for each control group and wholly- acquired firms pairing, the 
sample is divided by propensity score quintiles, and for each subsample the equality in means of the pre-treatment covariates 
between acquired and non-acquired firms is tested. 
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